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ABSTRACT 
 
The paper examines the relationship between organisational innovation, the introduction of new 
internet-based ICTs, de-verticalisation, and the rapid growth in business service outsourcing 
over the last decade. In order to examine this issue, a model of organisational innovation is 
developed. In this model, the goal of managers is to identify an organisational design that more 
effectively integrates all the administrative activities of the firm. As part of the process of 
innovation, the managers can choose to carry out an administrative activity in-house or to 
outsource that activity. Key factors influencing this decision are the relative information costs of 
organising activities internally and the information costs associated with setting up and 
maintaining interfaces with external suppliers. The framework is examined within the context of 
a novel model of organisational innovation. Simulations conducted on this model enabled us to 
consider the short- and long-run impacts of outsourcing on administration overheads and on 
long-term productivity growth. An interesting finding is that managers of a firm can become 
locked into a low productivity growth trajectory, associated with the outsourcing of activities, if 
they are myopic and learn through their own actions. They perceive outsourcing to cut overhead 
costs in the short-run (as expected), and so engage in further outsourcing thereafter. This is to 
the detriment of long-run productivity gains (system economies) generated though 
organisational innovation. This occurs because the potential for organisational innovation is 
reduced when modular components are outsourced, placing them beyond the control of the 
firm’s management. The findings accord with the empirical data, and provide a salutary warning 
to managers and policy-makers about the potential long-term implications of outsourcing. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper examines the relationship between organizational innovation, the introduction 
of new internet-based ICTs, de-verticalisation, and the rapid growth in business service 
outsourcing over the last decade. Data are presented on a range of activities that are being 
outsourced. A set of potential advantages associated with outsourcing activities to knowledge-
intensive service providers is discussed. The latest empirical studies are also examined; these 
highlight a set of potential disadvantages associated with outsourcing. The studies suggest that 
outsourcing may have advantages in the short run, but have negative long-run implications for 
competitive performance. 
In order to examine this issue, a model of organisational innovation is developed. In this 
model, the goal of managers is to identify an organisational design that more effectively 
integrates all the administrative activities of the firm. As part of the process of innovation, the 
managers can choose to carry out an administrative activity in-house or to outsource that 
activity. Key factors influencing this decision are the relative information costs of organising 
activities internally and the information costs associated with setting up and maintaining 
interfaces with external suppliers. Herein lies the importance of new ICT. The introduction of 
new ICTs can alter the relative costs of internal and external administration. This captures a key 
stylised fact about knowledge-intensive business services (KIBS), such as business consultants, 
financial services, and ICT services: the rapid expansion of KIBS over the last decade is 
strongly connected the introduction and diffusion of internet-based networking ICTs.  
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the key concepts of 
organisational design and organisational innovation. It then outlines the core theoretical 
approach that is used to conceptualise organisational innovation. This is based on a modular 
theory of the firm, which is founded on the twin principles of increasing specialisation and the 
modularisation of complex organisational structures. Increasing the modularity of the 
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organisational structure not only leads to improvements in efficiency through specialisation, but 
enables a firm to realise systems economies, thereby pushing ahead the productivity frontier. At 
the core of the theoretical framework is a transmission mechanism between ICT adoption, 
organisational innovation and outsourcing. Using this theoretical framework, it is possible to 
discuss critically the long-run implications of outsourcing on productivity. Section 3 reviews 
recent empirical studies in order to identify a set of potential benefits and potential 
disadvantages associated with the outsourcing of activities to business services. It addresses, in 
particular, new empirical evidence that suggests that outsourcing can be detrimental to the 
innovative capacity of firms and, hence, have a negative impact on their long-run productivity 
growth. Section 4 describes the simulation model and the outputs it has generated. The model is 
used to investigate the manner in which the outsourcing of activities restricts the long-term 
opportunities for organisational innovation, leading to lower productivity growth. Section 5 
pulls together the overall findings of the paper and points to interesting directions for further 
research. 
 
2. Organisational Innovation 
 
The goal of organisational change is the identification of an organisational design that 
integrates more effectively all the administrative activities of the firm. An organisational design 
is a hierarchical structure that solves two key problems faced by managers. The first is the 
‘fundamental co-ordination problem’; namely, how to organise the value-adding activities and 
information flows of the firm most effectively in order to maximise profit. In addition, managers 
need to resolve the ‘agency problem’: to realise and enforce co-ordination and control in 
production, both internally and across the boundary of the firm.  
Organisational innovation involves the search for new organisational designs that alter 
the internal organisational structure of the firm, and change the boundary between the firm and 
markets (verticalisation/de-verticalisation). As just described, it is a search process that is 
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conducted within a complex search space containing many dimensions, and in which the 
dimensions are related to one another in highly non-linear ways. Dealing with this 
organisational complexity requires managers to engage in ongoing strategic experimentation and 
learning. It is this ongoing problem-solving activity that drives organisational change and 
innovation over time.  
Our analysis is based on a modular theory of the firm, developed in recent work by 
Langlois and Robertson (1995), Baldwin and Clark (1997), Langlois (2002, 2003), and Marengo 
and Dosi (2005). The theory brings together Adam Smith’s principles of specialisation and the 
division of labour (Smith, 1776), and Herbert Simon’s discussion of complexity and the near-
decomposability of complex problems (Simon, 1996, 2002), and provides a useful means of 
discussing organisational change and innovation. This theory is used to identify the set of 
conditions under which modularisation is associated with outsourcing to specialist KIBS, and to 
consider the impact of new ICTs on the decision to outsource.  
Simon (1996, 2002) provides an important insight into problem-solving activity in 
general. He provides us with an idea of how problem-solving activity occurs in complex 
systems. Simon suggested that complex problems can be made more manageable by breaking 
them down into a set of constituent parts, or ‘modular components’. In this way, the number of 
distinct elements in a system is reduced by grouping them into a smaller number of sub-systems. 
The great advantage of modularisation is that improvements can be made to one sub-component 
of the system without the need to change all the other parts of the system (as would be the case 
if there were no modularisation). There are costs, however. These are associated with the 
establishment and maintenance of organisational interfaces between sub-components. These 
interfaces enable a sub-component to function compatibly with all sub-components. This 
ensures the organisational structure as a whole functions in an integrated way, while maintaining 
a high degree of independence for each sub-component. Given these considerations, the task for 
management seeking a better division of labour becomes the identification of sub-systems, the 
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establishment of linkages between distinct sub-systems, and understanding, managing and 
codifying their interactions. First, they have to find out how to decompose its value-adding 
activities and, second, how to co-ordinate the sub-systems. Through successful modularisation, a 
complex system is then transformed into a nearly decomposable one.  
To this theory, the concept of ‘system economies’, which was introduced by Nightingale 
et al. (2003), is added. The interpretation of system economies here is that these are mostly due 
to an improvement in the control of a given set of productive activities and, hence, they operate 
at the meta level. Managers of the firm seek to improve productivity by re-organising the way in 
which these value-adding activities interact. This productivity improvement is gained through 
the implementation of a more effective organisational design. Organisational innovation, the 
process through which new designs are devised, involves either splitting the administrative tasks 
into more organisational modules or the integration of organisational modules to increase 
control of the modular elements and their interaction. A superior organisational design improves 
the co-ordination and control of goods, traffic, materials, funds, services, and information that 
flows through the complex supply, production and distribution activities of the firm. In this way, 
better organisational designs (that is, more effective modularisation schemas) increase the 
utilisation of the firm’s installed productive capacity. Innovation begets further innovation. 
Through organisational innovation, managers gain a more specific view of the different 
activities of the firm, and see the potential creative opportunities that arise through breaking 
down ‘departmental silos’ and creating novel synergistic activities (that is, new organisational 
combinations). For example, the creation of stronger interactions between the sales and 
production departments can lead to new product opportunities being realised. These in turn may 
lead to economies of scope and, if it is possible to develop new markets, economies of scale. 
This builds upon an argument put forward by Baldwin and Clark (1997): the more modular the 
organisational design, the greater the likelihood of stimulating new inventions; that is, 
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innovation in products/services, distribution, and the other key value adding activities of the 
firm.  
It is suggested here that the extent of organisational specialisation ultimately depends on 
a number of demand- and supply-side factors. On the demand side, it depends on the extent of 
the market (that is, increases in population and income), and the degree of competition (the 
elasticity of demand) (Young, 1928). On the supply side, it is affected by the availability of 
ICTs that enable activities to be subdivided and co-ordinated, and which enable managers to 
deal with the agency problem. To do this, managers must be able to generate information on the 
parts of the organisation for which they are directly responsible, and to exchange between them 
information on those different parts of the organisation. Together, the demand- and supply-side 
factors determine the extent to which activities can be effectively modularised and technical 
hierarchies established.  
A number of issues can be discussed within this theoretical framework. To start with, the 
framework clarifies the relationship between new ICTs and more effective administrative 
control leading to system economies. The application of new, improved ICTs enable further 
modularisation of the organisation to occur by lowering the cost of managing and controlling 
information; this can lead to increased system economies (Brynolfsson and Hitt, 2000). It was 
Chandler (1962, 1977) who first claimed that technology directly affects organisational 
structure. His observation goes to the heart of the present discussion. New ICTs alter the set of 
feasible technological opportunities in production and the division of labour (the fundamental 
co-ordination problem), and the opportunities for effective co-ordination and control within and 
across the boundary of the firm (the agency problem). These alter the relative efficacy of 
holding activities in-house and outsourcing. Depending on the particular vintage of ICTs, 
technological opportunities and cost reductions may stimulate verticalisation or de-
verticalisation.  
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Internet-based ICTs enable the external co-ordination costs of the firm to be significantly 
reduced. This opens up new opportunities for outsourcing to occur within new, or experimental, 
organisational designs. Over the last decade, a new generation of ‘networking’ ICTs (built on 
open web and internet protocols) have provided the means by which firms can radically re-
organise interactions with firms along the supply chain. It has opened up previously 
inconceivable levels of interaction between companies. This includes new opportunities for 
outsourcing to specialist KIBS providers. The networked corporation has emerged as a 
consequence of inter-firm networking activities along the supply chain. This has led to a 
flattening of the hierarchy of the firm, a tendency towards vertical disintegration, and for 
individual business units to become smaller in size. 
It is important to note that the relationship between new ICTs and outsourcing is not 
simple. Certain types of new ICTs may decrease both the internal and external costs of 
communication. Internet technologies, for example, lower the cost of internal administration 
(through applications such as intranets) as well as reducing the administrativen cost of external 
interaction. Others reduce internal costs only. As discussed by Reinstaller and Hölzl (2004), 
ICTs that were limited in their application to internal administrative activities (such as 
calculators, typewriters, Hollerith electric tabulating machines, and book-keeping machines) 
played an important role in the development of u-form and m-form hierarchies. Chandler (1977) 
and Yates (2000) have discussed the way in which these technologies were essential for the 
emergence of the modern hierarchical organisation in the period between the 1850s and the 
1930s. Large corporations were the key purchasers of these new ICT1 technologies, and these 
technologies in turn further enhanced their ability to grow in size, with a tendency towards 
vertical integration and the greater centralisation of activities by bringing activities in-house, 
increasing the hierarchy within the firm.  
A second issue that is of central importance in this paper is the long-run implications of 
outsourcing for firm performance. On the one hand, as discussed, internet-based technologies 
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reduce the cost of setting up organisational and information-based interactions with KIBS. This 
makes the outsourcing of activities that can be delivered more cheaply by the external supplier 
possible. At the same time, outsourcing reduces the internal administrative overhead of the firm. 
However, there are limits to the benefits of modularisation. To start with, while internal 
administration overheads are reduced, external administration overheads rise because an 
effective interface with the external provider needs to be set-up and maintained. The net benefit, 
in terms of administrative overheads, depends on whether the cost of the external interface is 
greater or lower than the cost of the internal interface. This is the non-separability effect 
discussed by Steinmueller (2003), and Miozzo and Grimshaw (2005). They suggest that the 
governance structures that oversee the interface interactions between client and supplier 
represent large, sunk investments. Consequently, suppliers are not easily substituted.  
A more important potential disadvantage is the impact of outsourcing on the client’s 
long-run potential for organisation innovation and, hence, on its long-run productivity growth. 
To understand this, the transmission mechanism just discussed can be applied. If new, internet-
based ICTs significantly reduce external administration costs compared to internal ones, there is 
a stimulus for outsourcing. However, by outsourcing, the set of internal activities under the 
direct management of the firm is reduced. This reduces the set of modular elements with which 
managers can experiment and innovate to create new, more efficient organisational designs. In 
the long run, this can lead to lower productivity growth in the client firm. Prencipe (1997) and 
Brusoni et al. (2001) stress the need to retain control over R&D, not just for the activity itself, 
but because it is important to maintain control of the co-ordination of R&D, design and 
manufacturing activities.  
 
3. Potential Advantages and Disadvantages of Outsourcing 
 
The 1990s saw a dramatic rise in the number of specialised business service firms. The 
sheer range of activities that are being outsourced is highlighted by McCarthy’s (2002) study of 
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outsourcing by US firms. These activities not only include basic back-office activities such as 
payrolls, but they also include advanced, back-office activities such as legal services, and client-
facing front-office activities in sales and marketing. The purchase of business services from 
external providers raised the performance of client firms in both services and manufacturing. 
While acknowledgement of the role played by business services in economic development is not 
new (see, for example, Greenfield, 1966), empirical studies of their impact are. For example, 
Windrum and Tomlinson (1999) tested the contribution to services and manufacturing of 
knowledge-intensive business services (KIBS) such as business consultants, financial services, 
and ICT services. Using input-output data from 1970 to 1990, they examined Germany, Japan, 
the Netherlands, and the UK. KIBS were found to have a positive impact on both service and 
manufacturing sectors in all four countries over the twenty-year period. Similar findings have 
been identified in studies by Drejer (2001), Peneder et al. (2003) and Tomlinson (2003). So, 
while the use of business services has grown rapidly, their use is not new.  
A number of studies have sought to identify the key drivers for outsourcing. One of the 
best known is in the Morgan Chambers study of FTSE 100 firms (Morgan Chambers, 2001). In 
addition, there is The Outsourcing Institute’s study of outsourcing in Japan (Outsourcing 
Institute, 2005). Taken together, these studies present a remarkably consistent picture. These are 
presented in Table 1 below. We see that the top three drivers are the same in each study. These 
are, in order, the reduction of operating costs, improving the focus of the business through a re-
organisation of the activities that are conducted in-house and those that are externally sourced, 
and access to skills and technologies that are not held in-house. In both surveys, these three 
drivers together accounted for more than 60 per cent of all responses. 
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Table 1. Drivers of Outsourcing in Rank Order
Morgan Chambers Study Outsourcing Institute Study 
Cost saving Reduce and control operating costs 
Focus on core business Improve company focus 
Access to skills and technology Gain access to world-class capabilities 
Risk management Free internal resources for other purposes 
Quality service improvement Resources are not available internally 
Change enabler Accelerate reengineering benefits  
Business development Function is difficult to manage/out of control 
Other Make capital funds available 
 Share risks 
 Cash infusion 
  
 
These three key drivers have also been highlighted in the literature on KIBS. KIBS 
provide their clients with high-quality information on new business opportunities, new trends in 
the market place, and the business potential of new technologies, such as new ICTs. Through the 
outsourcing of specific inputs to KIBS, clients can improve productivity and competitive 
performance as existing in-house inputs are substituted for higher-quality, externally sourced 
inputs. Third, KIBS are exemplars of novel business models. They provide a concrete 
illustration of new business models and, through their ongoing relationship, introduce clients to 
these new ways of working and to new technologies. Antonelli (1998), for example, has 
highlighted the role of KIBS on the diffusion of new ICTs. KIBS are leading advocates of new, 
internet-based technologies because these technologies enable them to interface more effectively 
with clients and, as a consequence, to intermediate more effectively experience, information and 
knowledge between clients. In this way, KIBS have become key intermediaries, improving the 
efficiency and speed of learning within innovation networks. 
As noted in section 2, a set of potential disadvantages associated with outsourcing exists. 
One potential disadvantage of outsourcing is its negative long-run implications for organisation 
innovation and, hence, long-run productivity growth. An empirical study based on a large-scale 
survey of large and medium-sized Swedish manufacturing and service firms has been conducted 
by Bengtsson and von Hartman (2005). They found that companies’ evaluations of the direct 
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effects of outsourcing, for example, cost reduction through a diminution in the numbers of those 
directly employed, were fulfilled. However, management and administrative functions were not 
reduced. Indeed the firms report a strongly negative impact of outsourcing on logistics – for 
example, manufacturing lead times, delivery times and accuracy. They also report adverse 
effects on quality and the ability to adapt to customer demands. These key findings indicate that 
outsourcing is accompanied by more complex logistics, increasing the internal administrative 
overhead. Bengtsson and von Hartman report that these logistics problems were more common 
among amongst companies that outsource to low-cost countries. 
These findings are supported by research conducted by other authors. First, it is observed 
that the contract needs to be monitored and measured carefully. This can prove expensive, and, 
indeed, increasingly so if skills in the client firm are lost over time (Domberger, 1998). Second, 
governance inseparability between client and supplier means considerable investment in 
interpersonal and administrative relations between the firms is necessary in order to support the 
new division of labour (Steinmueller, 2003; Miozzo and Grimshaw, 2005). Third, poorly 
delivered services will negatively affect the client’s production or, where end-user services are 
delivered, the client’s brand and reputation (Hinks and Hanson, 2001). Fourth, the security of 
sensitive information needs to be considered, with an increased risk of exposure of the clients’ 
sensitive internal information (Mylott III, 1995). Fifth, there are well-documented cases of 
knowledge and information, acquired by the service provider, being shared with the clients’ 
competitor firms. Clients believed that services and information would be proprietary, while the 
service providers saw the transactions as the basis for further business within the client’s 
industry. 
Of course, it is not just low-skilled activities that are being outsourced. Complex 
production and advanced R&D are also being outsourced. The inseparability of ICT from 
production means suppliers are not turn-key, that is, they cannot be easily substituted (Miozzo 
and Grimshaw, 2005). Prencipe (1997) highlights the dangers of outsourcing activities based on 
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simple notions of core and non-core competences. The outsourcing of what today appear to be 
non-core competences can seriously impair the development of new (core) technological 
competences in the future. Separation of development and production hampers innovation. 
Brusoni et al. (2001) emphasise the importance of retaining control over R&D, and the ability to 
co-ordinate the R&D, design and manufacturing activities of suppliers.  
To summarise, a growing body of empirical research exists that suggests that the short-run 
gains of outsourcing may be more than offset in the longer term, leading to lower long-run 
productivity growth. This paper has formulated a theoretical framework for understanding these 
dangers; one that links organisational innovation with the adoption of new ICTs and with 
outsourcing opportunities. The framework enables us to identify a specific transmission 
mechanism between ICT adoption, organisational innovation and outsourcing. Further, the 
framework explains why outsourcing can have a negative impact upon organisational innovation 
and productivity in the long run. Specifically, the outsourcing of activities reduces the total set 
of modular elements that can be experimented with in the future. With fewer components under 
their control, managers are unable to experiment with all possible organisational combinations. 
The danger is that this precludes the ability to discover more efficient organisational designs. 
Hence, the firm can become locked in to a sub-optimal design space. If this is the case, then the 
outsourcing firm will suffer lower growth in productivity than if it had not outsourced (and the 
entire space of organisational designs could have be explored).  
 
4. The Modelling of Organisational Innovation, Outsourcing Strategies and the Impact of 
ICTs 
We have developed a model that captures the most important of the recent theoretical 
developments discussed in Section 2 of this paper. Here we use the model to study the effect of 
internet-based ICTs on outsourcing, organisational innovation and long-run productivity. New 
possibilities arise because internet-based ICTs reduce external co-ordination costs. We shall not, 
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in this paper, examine co-invention and co-production. Instead we focus on the outsourcing to 
KIBS of knowledge-intensive co-ordination and management activities, which have been 
highlighted in the empirical data discussed above. This includes, for example, the outsourcing of 
IT services to specialist KIBS providers. We examine the long-run implications of this type of 
outsourcing activity on organisational innovation and, consequently, productivity growth.  
The model differs to standard economic models in three respects. First, it embodies the 
idea of a partially non-separable organisation and technology for the firm. Second, and in line 
with recent work on the theory of the firm and organisation, it views organisational change as a 
process of re-modularisation. Third, it assumes that firms are boundedly rational and learn 
adaptively from past experience. The first and third assumptions mean the model cannot be 
solved using closed-form analytical techniques, but must be investigated through simulation 
modelling. 
At the heart of this model is the idea that management and business activities deliver 
services to production activities by fostering their productivity. Therefore, management has an 
incentive to improve the organisation and quality of managerial and administrative processes or 
‘services’. It is assumed that management and administration are organised into teams. This 
implies there are inherent problems of control and co-ordination due to interdependencies and 
complementarities between the single activities or members in each team. As a consequence, the 
resulting organisation or technology is non-convex and cannot be optimised component-wise. 
Only if the organisation is modularised, that is, when teams are broken up and the specialisation 
of activities is fostered, is piecewise optimisation possible. To achieve this, the sources of 
interdependencies need to be identified, broken up and replaced by standardised interfaces, such 
that each modularised activity becomes interchangeable. This has been worked out in detail by 
Reinstaller and Hölzl (2004). We implement these ideas in a simple way by drawing on ideas 
developed by Altenberg (1995). It is assumed  that the administration of a firm consists of a 
number of teams. Each team is represented by a vector in which each element is drawn from a 
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uniform distribution with values bounded between 0 and 1. The values reflect the performance 
of these activities, which may be interpreted as an index that captures how far each activity is 
from its (theoretical) productivity frontier for given skill levels and technical equipment.  
The productivity of management and administrative activities is difficult to measure. It is 
assumed that it is reflected in their capability to reduce the labour cost of productive (or shop 
floor) activities. If one of the elements in the vector (one of the team members or one of the 
activities in a team) is changed by replacing it with a better performing element, non-
separability means there are changes in all performance values in that vector (that is, for each 
element a new draw is made). The average performance of a team is given by the average value 
over all elements constituting it. This implies that it is more difficult to change performance for 
a larger team than for a smaller team.  
In the present model, the management tries to solve the problems of co-ordination and 
control by introducing organisational innovations that allow it to control single activities in 
better ways. There are three possible innovation strategies: 
 
1. The first strategy is ‘split’. Here a large vector is split into smaller vectors and a 
neutralising interface connects the smaller teams within a new organisational process. 
This division of labour/specialisation process enables management to raise performance.  
2. The second strategy is ‘replace’. Here work performed by an existing team is improved 
by replacing its old working routines with the new, improved ones.  
3. The third strategy is ‘integrate’. This involves job enrichment strategies, combining 
activities and creating beneficial synergies, in order to improve productivity.  
 
The probability of choosing any one of these strategies changes endogenously through 
reinforcement learning, as described by Arthur (1991). This means the weight of the probability 
of a strategy to be chosen by the management increases or decreases as it proves to be more or 
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less successful in improving the performance of managerial activities. Another aspect of 
organisational innovation discussed in Section 2 of this paper is that the literature on modularity 
assumes that innovativeness increases as a function of the degree of decomposition of 
organisations (see, for instance, Langlois 2002). It is, therefore, assumed that as the modularity 
of the organisation increases firms may invest in R&D to explore new innovation possibilities 
that increase the performance of all management activities. Following Silverberg and Verspagen 
(1994), these innovations are modelled as a Poisson process where the arrival parameter 
depends on the modularity of the activities.  
In line with the discussion in Section 3 we study the comparative dynamic behaviour of 
the model with respect to two parameters. The first parameter is the outsourcing propensity of 
the management (denoted as ‘OSP’ in Figure 1). Altering the value of this parameter enables 
one to assess its impact on the dynamic behaviour. The outsourcing propensity captures the risk 
attitude of management, that is, its risk position towards the potential gains of outsourcing set 
against the loss of in-house managerial/administrative competences. Business service providers 
are assumed to have cost advantages over the firm in the production of certain services (see Box 
9 in Figure 1). The process of outsourcing involves the service provider and the outsourcing 
firm negotiating a contract for the delivery of a specific service (for example, the management 
and delivery of specific IT services), at a specified price. If the outsourcing firm enters this 
contract, it shuts down its own activities and loses these competences. To simplify, it is assumed 
here that these are lost forever. This strong assumption is not necessarily unrealistic. Empirical 
evidence indicates it can be extremely difficult and expensive to re-acquire competences, 
especially in knowledge-intensive activities.  
 
Administration 
Figure 1 shows how an organisational design is conceptualised here. It is assumed that 
the administration of a firm delivers services to productive activities that eventually generate the 
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value added by the firm. The quality of these services, θ1 to θ4 in Figure 1, has an impact on the 
performance of productive activities. These services are produced by organisational activities m1 
and m2 (see Figure 1a) which produce a subset of all services. More generally, the organisation 
of a firm consists of a set of  organisational modules or activities  grouped into an 
organisational design d =<m
n im
1, m2, …,mn> that delivers a vector θ  of  services to productive 
activities in the firm. The array  corresponds to one organisational design, which is drawn 
from a finite space  of organisational designs. These are explored by management over time.  
k
d D∈
D
Each of the activities present in a design consists of  sub-activities or . 
The number of sub-activities  in each of these modules may vary, but it is assumed that each 
affects exactly one of the k  output characteristics. Each larger activity in turn affects some 
subset of the services to the productive activities. Together these output characteristics meet 
well-defined customer needs in the market in which the firm operates. In the model here, the 
organisation of a firm is, therefore, defined through the characteristics of an organisational 
design  given by  organisational modules  and  service characteristics. The number of 
modules n is a measure of the degree of decomposition of organisational activities.  
il ilhki xm 1=>=<
il
d n im k
 
Figure 1. Interdependence and modularity in organizational designs 
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The sub-activities x in each module  are strongly related to one another, that is, the 
performance of each sub-activity 
im
( )k txφ  at time step t affects the performance of all other sub-
activities in the module and its performance is, in turn, influenced by all other sub-activities in 
the module. This implies that the total performance of a module ( )i tmφ  changes if ( )k txφ  
changes. The modules  themselves are linked through organisational and technical interfaces 
that neutralise the strong complementarities that persist between the sub-activities within each 
module. These interdependencies reflect a situation that is typical in team production, where the 
skills and activities of the members in a team are closely complementary and integrated. So, if 
one member performs under par, the work efficiency of all other members is affected. This is 
shown in Figure 1. If the management wants to improve service θ
im
3 produced in organisational 
module m2 then changing the work profile of the related activity x will actually imply the 
performance of the sub-activity producing service θ4 is also affected. In the simulations we will 
determine ( )i tmφ  by drawing  values from a uniform distribution with il
]1,0[Uniform)( →tkxφ and calculating the average over the  sub-activities. The impact of all 
n service producing administrative activities on firm performance is then given by, 
il
1
1
( )nt n i mφ=Φ = ∑ i t . (This representation of organisational designs and their impact on the 
performance of productive activities corresponds to a generalised NK model (see Altenberg, 
1995).)
In Figure 1b the problem of strong complementarity is resolved by splitting module m2 
into two distinct sub-activities where each is focused on producing exactly one service. The co-
ordination problem between the two sub-activities is solved by introducing a co-ordination 
mechanism between the two. Therefore the hierarchy increases and the co-ordination overhead 
increases. This captures Simon’s (1996) idea of realising near-decomposable designs in order to 
control complex problems better. In this process, economies of system are realised. 
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Organisational Learning: Exploitation vs. Exploration 
The management of the firm is assumed to use a set of strategies  to explore the space 
of organisational designs . The strategy space 
S
D 1 2 3(S s s s )= , ,  consists of three strategies, each 
of which is used with probability jμ  at each time step t . The firm pursues them to improve 
administrative services that have an impact on the performance of productive activities. The first 
strategy  corresponds to learning by doing. In this case all values for 1s 1( )k txφ +  are redrawn, and 
if the average over the sub-activities increases this will correspond to a performance 
improvement. The second and the third innovation strategies involve changing the 
organisational design of the firm. This is illustrated in Figure 2. The firm may engage in 
identifying and neutralising some of the complementarities that bind sub-activities into a 
module. This may enable it to split a more complex activity into a number of less complex 
activities and redesign its organisation accordingly. This decomposition strategy  is called 
‘splitting’. It corresponds to the development of a near-decomposable design of administrative 
activities. Finally, it may pay the firm to redesign its production and organisation by organising 
smaller activities into larger and more complex modules. It is the reverse strategy of 
decomposition. It involves the selective acquisition of complementarity relationships between 
previously unrelated activities by, say, supporting the development of synergies. This 
integration strategy  we call ‘job-enrichment’. In both  and  the organisational design is 
changed, with poorly performing activities replaced by better performing ones. In this case all 
performance values 
il
2s
3s 2s 3s
1( )k txφ +  for the elements in the new module(s) are redrawn and if their joint 
average increases this will again correspond to a performance improvement. 
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Figure 2. Splitting and Enrichment as Strategies in Organizational Re-Design 
 
 
 
 
 
These strategies are assumed to affect the performance Φt of productive activities through 
economies of system, that is, by allowing for better control of productive activities and, 
therefore, pushing productivity for a given technology towards its limit.  
As discussed earlier, the literature on modularity advances the argument that an increase 
of the modularity of a system leads also to an improvement in the innovation rate. The basic 
idea behind this is that modularity allows a better understanding of the workings of a system 
and, therefore, increases the chance that better ways of doing things are discovered. Here it is 
assumed that, depending on the degree of decomposition of the administration of the firm given 
by the number of activities n, the likelihood that better ways of organising the production 
process are discovered increases if the firm invests into this process of exploration. This will 
push ahead the performance Φt of productive activities by a factor (1 )tε+ , where 
1 (1 )t tε ε τ+ = + . In the simulation, parameter τ has a small positive value as does tε  at t=0. The 
probability of the firm making an innovation tε  is determined by a Poisson process with an 
arrival rate α. Following Silverberg and Verspagen (1994), it is assumed that the firm’s 
  19
investments have first increasing and then decreasing returns, which are reflected in a logistic 
representation of the arrival rate given by 
 
( )
min max
1 ( * )
min max min
tt r n
α αα α α α+ −= + − . 
 
 
Here minα  represents a small autonomous probability of making a fortuitous innovation without 
investing in this type of innovation, and maxα  corresponds to an asymptotic saturation level of 
the arrival rate. As can be seen, this process depends on the propensity to invest (r) and on the 
degree of decomposition, which essentially captures the innovation potential. 
The behaviour of the firm is given by the probability distribution over its three actions. 
The innovation policy mix 1 1 2 2 3 3[ ]t t t ts s s sμ μ μ ′, , ,= , with 1 2 3 1t t tμ μ μ, , ,+ + = , that maximises 
profits , evolves through reinforcement learning given some initial probabilities ( )d tsΠ 0j tμ , = . 
This should not be interpreted as conscious randomisation, rather it indicates (from the 
perspective of the outside observer) how likely it is that the decision maker will choose each of 
these three actions. The reinforcement learning dynamics applied here is identical to the one 
explored by Arthur (1993), where each of the strategies is allocated a strength according to its 
past contribution to the performance of the firm  
 
 1
( ) ( )
( )
j t j t j tj
j t j t
j tj t
s s
s
μμ μ ,, + ,
ΔΠ − ΔΠ= + ΔΠ ,
∑
∑ ∑  (1)  
 
where 1( ) ( ) ( )j t j t js s s −ΔΠ = Π −Π t  indicates the change in the performance improvement between 
two time steps  and t 1t −  where strategy js  was used. Equation (1) reinforces the strategies that 
performed best in the past, that is, those which previously maximised profits.  
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Costs of Production for a given Organisational Design 
It is assumed that white-collar activities are not productive in themselves, but that they 
improve the utilisation and the development of the firm’s productive resources. More precisely, 
It is assumed that the services produced by an administrative activity mi have an impact on the 
performance of productive activities, ( )i tmφ . As mentioned previously, the impact on the unit 
costs of productive activities by all n modules is given by Φt. The unit costs of productive 
activities are then given by: 
 
(1 )
, ,t td t p pvc w l e
ε− + Φ=  
 
where wp is the average wage bill per unit of output paid for productive activities, and lp is the 
unit labour requirement.  
In the administration of a firm there are two types of activities. The first set of activities 
produces services for productive activities. The second set of activities co-ordinate the 
interaction between these services. Only service-producing administrative activities are 
outsourced as co-ordination activities typically reflect critical management skills. We also 
assume that the number of services a module produces is proportional to its skill intensity, that 
is, the more services an activity produces, the higher the skills levels are that are required to 
carry them out. This in turn implies that the average wage paid to these activities is higher than 
to activities where only a few services are produced. For simplicity, it is assumed that the unit 
wage cost of producing one service to productive activities and that of carrying out one co-
ordination task are the same.  
Information technologies affect co-ordination costs. Here a distinction is made between 
the cost of internal co-ordination and the cost of external co-ordination. Total administrative 
overhead costs are then defined by: 
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( ) ( )ext int, int(1 ) ,d t a h choc zl w z p l w e eθ θν ν− −= + − + + ext∑l  
 
where la and lc are the unit labour requirements for service and co-ordination activities, w is the 
going wage rate paid per “skill unit”, l  is the average number of services produced in each 
administrative activity, ph are the prices paid for outsourced activities, νint and νext are the 
number of internal and external co-ordination activities, and θint and θext reflect the impact of the 
use of ICTs on internal and external co-ordination costs respectively. Variable z, 0≤ z ≤1, 
weights the unit costs of production of administrative services produced in-house and those 
produced elsewhere by their respective share in the total number of services produced. 
It is assumed that a subcontractor typically has a cost advantage in producing a particular 
service. If a specific service producing administrative module mi is outsourced the unit cost of 
production of its services by the service firm is then given by: 
 
),( ext,extint,,, int
θθ ννγ −− ++= eewlwlcs hhhchihah l  
 
where γ now reflects the comparative cost advantage service firm h has in producing the 
services of administrative activity mi. In the simulations we will assume that , that 
is, the cost advantage is normally distributed around a mean of 1 (meaning that, a priori, there 
might be no cost advantage) with some variance σ
),1( 2σγ N→
2. Variables la,s and lc,h reflect the relative unit 
labour requirements for service producing and co-ordination activities and νint,h and νext,h indicate 
the number of internal and external co-ordination activities the service supplier has to manage. 
Assuming now that the supplier has some market power such that the company is able to charge 
a positive mark-up ξ over costs then the unit price for the services of supplier h to the 
outsourcing firm is given by: 
 
  22
( )1h hp csξ= + . 
 
Finally, it is assumed that the firm has a certain propensity r to invest part of its revenues into 
the exploration of innovation potentials due to the modularity of the administration. These costs 
are then given by:  
t trc rp qt= , 
where pt and qt are the prices charged and the quantities sold at a time step t.  
 
Profits 
 
If the firm acts in an environment in which monopolistic competition prevails, it will 
face a downward sloping (inverse) demand given by: 
η/1
t
t q
Isp = , 
where pt is the price the firm is able to charge at time t, Is is the amount of income customers 
spend on the firm’s product, qt is the firms output and η, η > 1, is the price elasticity of demand. 
Following standard theory, the optimum output and price for a given organisational design d are 
given by: 
 (1 1 )t d
d t d t
Isq
vc oc
ηη∗
,
, ,
⎡ ⎤−= ,⎢ ⎥+⎣ ⎦
  
 , ,*,
( )
1
d t d t
t d
vc oc
p
η
η
+= −   
 
Therefore, for each organisational design d the firm tries to maximise profits  
 
ttttdtdttd crcqocvcps −−−−=Π *,,* )()( , 
  23
 by reducing the unit costs of production. In the model presented here, the firm does this by 
pursuing different strategies st of organisational innovation that enable improvements in the 
performance of the firm’s productive activities to be made. The term ct reflects the fixed capital 
cost. It is assumed that the firm needs to keep its capital-output ratio constant and, therefore, 
invests or disinvests as output changes.  
 
 The Adoption and Outsourcing Decision 
The decision to adopt an organisational innovation and the decision to outsource will 
depend on the economic profitability of doing so. Therefore, the management of the firm will 
calculate the expected profits ( )tdE s′⎡Π⎣ ⎤⎦
,
that a new organisational design d’ is likely to 
generate and compare them with the profits that the current design yields. Therefore, the 
decision rule to adopt a new organisational design d’ is given by the following inequalities: 
 
  
( ) ( ) reject innovation
( ) ( ) accept innovation
d t td
d t td
s E s
s E s
′
′
⎧ ⎡ ⎤Π ≥ Π⎪ ⎣ ⎦⎨ ⎡ ⎤Π < Π⎪ ⎣ ⎦⎩
 
Depending on the management strategy, a firm may have a certain propensity to pursue 
outsourcing as a strategy, such that, given strategy parameter os, 0 ≤ os ≤ 1, it will calculate the 
expected profits of outsourcing these services to other firms leading to an organisational design 
d’’ with probability pros
 
 . 
( ) ( ) inhouse
if
( ) ( ) outsource
t td d
os
t td d
E s E s
pr os
E s E s
′′ ′
′′ ′
⎧ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤Π ≤ Π⎪ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦> ⎨ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤Π > Π⎪ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎩
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These are the decision rules the firm follows in order to maximise its profits at each moment in 
time. 
 
5. Results  
Using the model, four different scenarios have been examined. The parameters used to 
calibrate the model are given in the appendix. The results of the simulation runs are presented in 
Figure 3. The plots in the top quadrant of Figure 3 show the development of productivity in the 
firm. The bold line always represents the mean over 50 runs for each parameter setting, while 
the thin dashed lines represent the 95 per cent confidence interval of the results of the runs. The 
plots in the middle of Figure 3 show the development of overhead costs over time and, finally, 
the plots in the bottom quadrants show the depth of hierarchy of the firm’s administration 
structure.  
The first two scenarios, presented in the left part of Figure 3, juxtapose the impact of 
ICTs on performance, and the costs of the firm for a given high propensity of managers to 
choose outsourcing as a strategy. The results for low internal, but high external, co-ordination 
costs are represented by dash-dot-dash lines, while those for equally efficient internal and 
external communication costs are represented by unbroken lines.  
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Figure 3. Simulation Runs 
 
 
Notes: The left-hand graphs represent a scenario with high outsourcing propensity by management; those in the 
right, a scenario with low outsourcing propensity by management. Dash-dot-dash lines represent runs with low 
internal communication costs only for a given outsourcing propensity. Unbroken lines represent runs with low 
internal and low external communication costs for a given outsourcing propensity. The bold lines represent means 
over 50 runs, the thin dashed lines 95 per cent confidence intervals around these means. 
 
The findings suggest that a high outsourcing propensity, supported by low external co-
ordination costs, lead to a paradoxical development. The firm performs worse in the long run if 
external co-ordination costs fall. The explanation for this apparent paradox is as follows. 
Managers of the firm are myopically learning over time. They do not have information on the 
payoffs of all possible choices, and are unable to observe the pay-offs of firms that choose a 
different strategy. Hence, they are only able to observe the payoffs associated with their own 
past choices. In other words, managers of the firm are engaged in pure learning-by-doing. In 
practice, this is a reasonable approximation of the reality for managers in the vast majority of 
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firms. Unlike physical products and services, which can be obtained and reverse engineered, 
managers do not have ready access to information on other firms’ organisational structures, 
administrative services, and the performance of those organisational structures.  
Under these circumstances, the managers of the firm perceive there to be cost-cutting 
potentials if ICTs lead to a fall in external co-ordination costs, and proceed to outsource a high 
number of service activities. As a consequence, the depth of the hierarchy is reduced and in the 
beginning overhead costs drop as well. Productivity also grows initially. It grows at a much 
slower rate than if the firm had not outsourced but, of course, the firm does not actually ‘see’ 
this in practice because it has chosen to pursue the alternative trajectory of outsourcing. 
Unfortunately, as the firm continues along this path, productivity growth continues to fall and 
can even stagnate. The upshot is that managers focused on the short-run cost-cutting effect will 
succeed in reducing costs, but will, unwittingly, reduce the long-run innovation potential of the 
firm as well.  
New ICTs lower internal co-ordination costs. This supports the development of 
increased modularity in the administration of the firm. As the activities become more 
specialised, it is easier to improve the quality of their service to the productive activities. At the 
same time, the long-run potential for radical organisational innovations is exploited successfully. 
The long-run productivity of the firm under this scenario outperforms alternative scenarios 
where external co-ordination costs are lowed by new ICTs and firms engage in outsourcing. 
These results lend support to the thesis that the ‘quick-fix’ strategy, to outsource in order to 
reduce costs, endangers the long-run performance and survival of firms.  
On the right hand side of Figure 2, the results for the third and fourth scenarios are 
presented. In these scenarios, the outsourcing propensities of management are low. Again, we 
consider what happens if ICT reduces external co-ordination costs and what happens if ICTs 
reduce internal external co-ordination costs. Once again, the finding is that ICTs which stimulate 
internal organizational innovation outperform the scenario where ICTs stimulate outsourcing. 
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As before, the reason is that the long-run productivity potential of the firm depends on the 
degree of decomposition of administrative activities. Therefore, firms always fare better in the 
long run if they keep the service activities in-house and reap all the benefits of the process of 
organizational innovation. Once activities are outsourced, suppliers in our model charge a 
constant price and no longer improve the quality of the services they deliver. As a consequence, 
producing services in-house is the dominant strategy in this simulation.  
The results seem to mirror the observations of the empirical studies discussed in section 
3. However, it is important to observe that long-run productivity of the scenarios with low 
external co-ordination cost comes close to the long-run productivity levels where external co-
ordination costs are high in the upper end of the confidence interval. This outcome depends on 
the propensity of the firm to invest in radical organisational innovation. It suggests that, if a firm 
chooses to (moderately) outsource and is inclined to do so by low external co-ordination costs, it 
should scale up its investment in radical organisational innovations, which will exploit the 
potential for innovation better. 
 
6. Conclusions and Suggestions for Future Research 
The paper has investigated the thesis that outsourcing activities to business services 
(KIBS) can cut certain types of administrative costs, but that they may reduce productivity 
growth in the long run. This is the striking thesis that is emerging from the latest empirical 
research on the long-term impacts of outsourcing on the innovative capabilities and productivity 
growth of client firms. The paper summarised the short- and long-term costs and benefits of 
outsourcing, and proceeded to place them a more analytical footing through the development of 
a framework of organisational innovation that integrates decisions to outsource with the 
introduction of cost saving new ICTs. The framework specified a transmission mechanism that 
explains the links between the adoption of new ICTs, alternative strategies for organisational 
restructuring, system economies and the decision to outsource.  
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The framework has been implemented in a novel model of organisational innovation. 
Simulations conducted on this model enabled us to consider the short- and long-run impacts of 
outsourcing on administration overheads and on long-term productivity growth. The interesting 
finding is that managers of a firm can become locked into a low productivity growth trajectory, 
associated with the outsourcing of activities, if they are myopic and learn through their own 
actions. They perceive outsourcing to cut overhead costs in the short run (as expected), and so 
engage in further outsourcing thereafter. This is to the detriment of long-run productivity gains 
(system economies) generated though organisational innovation. This occurs because the 
potential for organisational innovation is reduced when modular components are outsourced, 
placing them beyond the control of the firms’ management. The findings accord well with the 
empirical data, and provide a salutary warning for managers and policy-makers about the 
potential long-term implications of outsourcing.  
Looking forward, there are a number of interesting extensions that can be made to the 
current model. Future research will also explore the relaxation of certain assumptions of the 
current model. For instance, outsourcing is purely concerned with access and cost of externally 
produced services. This accords with empirical findings regarding the main drivers of 
outsourcing. However, other considerations have been highlighted by the theoretical literature 
on KIBS, such as co-production and the co-innovation of products and services. These will be 
explored in future research. 
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